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PREFACE
For nearly three decades, mergers, acquisitions, and tender
offers have figured prominently in the news. More recently,
these transactions have aroused a great deal of concern
among business leaders, economists, stockholders, social
observers, and the media. New legislation and regulatory
changes affecting these transactions are now being considered at various levels of government.
Many of the issues raised by mergers and acquisitions are
addressed by this survey which tabulates and discusses the
responses of 217 corporate directors to phone interviews and
a mailed questionnaire. The questions elicited directors'
opinions on merger activity, the reasons for its recent high
levels and its probable future direction; on the merger
decision and the parties and interests that affect it; on the
tactics used by target companies, their banks and investment
bankers; on the harm and benefit produced by mergers; on
the regulation of mergers; and on the experience of the
respondents themselves.
This survey continues a series ofToucheRoss business
opinion studies. Other studies in the series are "Business
Executives on Nonprofit Boards," "The Changing Nature
of the Corporate Board," and "Fortune 500 Chief Executive
Officers' Opinions on Tax Reform."ToucheRoss business
opinion studies are shared with the business and financial
community, opinion leaders, government officials, and the
business press.

HIGHLIGHTS
Of the findings yielded by the survey, these were particularly
significant:
• The main reasons for the upsurge of mergers in recent years
are low stock prices (cited by 88 percent of the respondents)
and a weakened U.S. dollar (62 percent). Data and discussion
p. 9.
• However, 70 percent of the respondents expect merger
activity to decrease in the coming years. Data and discussion
p. 14.
• The major deterrent to mergers, say 72 percent, is the
difficulty of finding good acquisition candidates. Thirty-nine
percent see a prime deterrent in unfavorable economic conditions such as high interest rates. Data and discussion p. 11.

5

• Sixty-nine percent reject the widely held belief that poorly
managed companies are especially attractive takeover
targets. An overwhelming majority name the following
characteristics as those which make a company an attractive
acquisition candidate: a major product line in a rapidly
growing market (91 percent), excellent management (84 percent), and a dominant market position (78 percent). Data and
discussion p. 12.
• Ninety-five percent of the respondents say that the interests
of stockholders as a group should receive significant consideration in the target company's merger decision, but 22
percent report that stockholder interests get only some
consideration or none at all.Topmanagement, on the other
hand, does get significant consideration according to 58
percent of the respondents, but only 33 percent believe that
this much consideration is warranted. Data and discussion
p. 18.
• Despite many calls for representatives of employees other
than top management, minorities, and community interests
on corporate boards, 89 percent of the respondents oppose
such representation. Data and discussion p. 19.
• The best reasons for fighting a takeover bid, say a majority
of the respondents, are to elicit a higher bid (54 percent) or to
keep the door open for a white knight (53 percent). Data and
discussion p. 20.
• Whether it is proper for a besieged company to give confidential information to a white knight while denying it to
an unwelcome bidder is still a controversial issue. While 46
percent give the target company the option to be discriminatory, the remaining 54 percent are split: 30 percent say
the information should be available to all, and 24 percent say
the information should remain confidential. Data and discussion p. 22.
• Whether it is in the best interests of stockholders for a
company to retain a law firm specializing in tender offers in
order to prevent the firm from representing the opposition is
another unresolved issue: 53 percent say retain, 47 percent
say refrain. Data and discussion p. 23.
• Banks should not knowingly make loans to finance the
takeover of one of their own customers if the takeover bid is
hostile, say 60 percent. But 28 percent say such loans may be
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proper under certain circumstances—when, for example, the
bank has only a line relationship with the target company. If
the takeover bid is friendly, 85 percent agree that such loans
are proper. Data and discussion p. 24.
• Eighty-seven percent support the SEC proposal to extend
the waiting period during which tender offers must remain
open to thirty days, and many say that thirty days is still not
time enough. Data anddiscussion.p. 34.
• Only 24 percent oppose all government interference in
merger regulation. The remaining 76 percent, while maintaining that the market should rule in general, support
government regulation in certain areas, particularly
antitrust. Data and discussion p. 32.
• A clear majority of respondents believe that mergers have
a beneficial effect on society in the long run, particularly
through the redeployment of capital to more efficient uses
(63 percent) and greater efficiency in production (56 percent).
Data and discussion p. 31.

METHOD
These findings reflect the responses of 217 corporate directors to a questionnaire designed by Prof. James H. Scott Jr.,
Associate Professor of Finance, The Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University. Professor Scott conducted
telephone interviews to explore the reasoning behind
directors' opinions. The respondents are directors of
companies ranging in sales from $50 million to more than
$1 billion. The survey data were collected in the fall of 1980.
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Section 1

MERGER ACTIVITY
According to Federal Trade Commission statistics, merger
activity has maintained a generally high level ever since the
early 1950s. The assets of "large" manufacturing and mining
companies acquired, for example, have totaled $1 billion or
more in each year after 1953, and in some years have
exceeded $10 billion.* Why has the volume of merger
activity been so high in recent times?
A n overwhelming majority of the directors participating
Table 1
in the survey (88 percent) believe that one main reason is low What were the key reasons for the upsurge of mergers in recent years?
stock prices (Table 1). The market price of some stocks is
actually lower today than what the stockholders could
Major
Secondary
No
Reason
Reason
Reason
realize by putting the company out of business, selling its
assets, and distributing the proceeds. Many companies'
The low stock market makes it cheaper to
earnings, moreover, are unusually high in relation to their
88%
9%
3%
buy than to build
stock prices. Figure 1 shows how reported profits have soared
The weak U.S. dollar encourages the
above stock prices since 1972. Figure 2 shows that when
acquisition of U.S. companies by
both measures are adjusted for inflation, stock prices have
34
4
62
foreigners
actually dropped.
Because many companies are so undervalued, growthMany corporations have excess cash, and
minded corporations find it more economical to acquire
42
48
10
acquisitions are one way to spend it
existing companies than to build new facilities and organInflation encourages debt-financed
izations from scratch. "The odds," one director explained,
acquisitions because the debt can be
"are enormously in favor of buying an old, competent,
54
repaid with depreciated dollars
33
13
successful, and underpriced company rather than taking
the risk of building a new plant and wondering if you can
Acquisitions are easier because the growing institutional dominance of the stock
get environmental approval, meet OSHA requirements,
44
market has weakened stockholder loyalty
18
38
and penetrate a competitive market. You can accomplish
the same growth at less cost and with more chance of
success through an acquisition. Basically, this is the
result of undervaluation of stocks. Wall Street is failing
to value its product fully."
Another director, however, disputed the majority position.
"You have to pay too high a premium for acquisitions," he
said. "For example, I was thinking of putting us in the steel
distribution business. I found a large Chicago warehouse
distributor that had a book value of $5 million, and with its
return on investment, that's just what it was worth. But they
wanted $12 million. It would've been crazy to pay them a
*Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. Statistical Report on Mergers
and Acquisitions 1978 (published in August 1980), Table 14. "Large" companies
acquired are those with assets of $10 million or more.
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premium of $7 million when I can rent a building and go into
the business myself with $5 million."
But this experience does not seem to hold true for other
industries. One director gave this example: "In the extractive or natural resource areas, where you need substantial
capital expenditure, there are literally hundreds of public
companies in North America for which the replacement costs
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Figure1.Reported Profits and Stock Prices (1972 = 100)Figure 2. Inflation-Adjusted Profits and Stock Prices in
While stock prices remained fairly stable from 1972 to 1979,Constant Dollars
reported profits more than doubled. The reported profits When adjusted for inflation, the profits of all nonfinancial
shown are those ofall nonfinancial businesses, and Standard
businesses declined somewhat from 1972 to 1979, while stock
& Poor's Composite Index of 500 Stocks is used to represent
prices dropped sharply. Profits are adjusted for inflation by
the stock prices of these companies. The data are indexed reducing the reported (historical-cost) amounts by factors
using 1972 as the base year.
representing the estimated effect of inflation on inventories,
property, plant, and equipment. These current-cost amounts
are then stated in 1979 constant dollars using the GNP
Implicit Price Deflator. Stock prices are also stated in 1979
constant dollars.
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would run four, five, or six times the market equity."
A weak U.S. dollar is another major reason for the high
rate of mergers in recent years, most directors believe. The
low value of the dollar relative to other currencies has encouraged foreign investors to acquire American companies.
In their comments, some respondents offered another
reason: management's drive for self-aggrandizement. The
larger a company grows, the higher the compensation for
executives, even if earnings per share remain flat. Also,
enlarging a company tends to reduce the influence of major
stockholders.
B u t if there are so many powerful forces pushing the
Table 2
merger rate up, what has kept it from going even higher?
To what extent are the following deterrents to mergers?
The main brake on merger activity, directors agree, is the
Major
Secondary
difficulty of finding good acquisition candidates (Table 2). In
Deterrent
Deterrent
one director's definition, good candidates are "companies
that you could bring in and operate as independent busiDifficulty of finding good acquisition
72%
candidates
nesses, reaping the benefits of their growth. There are all
20%
kinds of dogs available—financially inept companies, sick
Unfavorable economic conditions, such as
companies, decadent companies, companies that need to
high interest rates
39
50
rebuild completely. Acquirers used to take companies like
that too, but they've come to regret it. In many cases they're Onerous government regulation, even in
the ones that you now see being spun off or liquidated.
the case of friendly mergers
32
53
"Nearly every large company I know," he went on, "has
Acquisition candidates rebuff offers that are
a full-scale corporate planning department that spends a
both friendly and generous
27
61
great deal of time trying to find acquisition candidates that
fit the parent, companies that can be bought at a reasonable Difficulty of successfully integrating
potential merger partners
25
52
price and have a price-to-earnings ratio that won't result in
excessive dilution. They're hard to find."
of lawyers and investment
No other factor was rated as a major deterrent by a major- Effectiveness
bankers in defending against hostile
ity of directors. Four additional factors, however, were mentakeovers
21
53
tioned by respondents.
• Management's objectives are different from those of the
stockholders. "The unwillingness of a CEO to lose his own
empire and become part of another company."
• While federal antitrust rules are a commonly accepted
feature of the environment, state takeover laws can present
difficult obstacles.
• Excessive prices asked for companies.
• "The gut feeling that a contested merger is dirty pool."

Little or
No
Deterrent

8%

11

15

12

23

26
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I f it is mainly the limited availability of attractive candidates for acquisition that restricts merger activity, just
what is it that makes a company attractive? The survey
suggested several characteristics, and directors rated them
as shown in Table 3.
One director's comments seem to summarize the results
shown in the table. "Most of the characteristics you've
listed," he said, "make a company attractive, but the most
honest and most testifiable one is a major product line in a
rapidly growing market. That's what acquirers are looking
for, and if theyfindit, they'll make concessions in the other
areas. I think you can see this now in industries like word
processing, where the small companies might have some
very good products, but only the big companies will have the
power and glory to put the total push behind those products."
Another director suggested several characteristics that
should be added to the list. They are:
• Low capital investment intensity. "You don't have to put
in a lot of dollars to get only a few dollars in sales."
• Low labor intensity. "Gives you flexibility."
• Absence of a major union. "If a plant is locked up by an
obnoxious union, you're going to have a lot of trouble."
• Little dependence on government business. "Government
requirements raise overhead expenses and complicate
the rest of your business, unless you keep the government
work in a totally separate accounting activity. Profits on
government business are disappointing anyway."
• Low rate of technological change.
• Little foreign competition.
One director told how he goes beyond the characteristics of
the acquisition candidate to assess the effects of the acquisition on his own company. "The first thing I'd want to know
is: How would it affect my earnings per share? Next I'd ask
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Table 3
Which of the following makes a potential target company attractive, and to what
extent?
Major
Attraction

Minor
Attraction

No
Attraction

Major product line in a rapidly growing
market

91%

Excellent management

84

14

2

Dominant market position

78

21

1

Ability to generate significant amounts of
cash

66

33

1

Low price-to-earnings ratio

54

38

8

Possibility of synergistic combination with
acquirer

52

42

6

Substantial excess cash or underutilized
debt capacity

43

54

3

9

22

69

Poor management

8%

1%

how my stockholders would react. What would the merger
do to my price-to-earnings ratio? I'd also want to know how
it would affect my return on investment, and whether it
would add to the real sustained growth I've already got
going."
Of the characteristics that were on the original list, poor
management received by far the lowest rating. One reason
for the undesirability of poor management in a candidate
for acquisition, as a respondent explains on page 28, is that
it increases the likelihood of "nasty surprises" after the
merger. Excellent management, on the other hand, received
the second-highest rating on the list. Apparently most
directors would reject the widely held belief that poorly
managed companies are especially frequent targets of
takeover attempts.
Since most directors recognize the success or failure that
companies experience in acquiring others as at least a
secondary factor in limiting mergers, the question naturally
arises: What makes a company a successful acquirer?
"By all odds," said one director, "the top answer is a
well-formulated strategic plan accompanied by strong
management talent. You've got to have both, and then the
other things will fall in line." Another added: "I must
emphasize the need for a strategy that includes a careful
plan of integration. It should specify the degree of autonomy
that the acquired company will have, spell out reporting
relationships, and settle other questions on how the two
organizations will interact."
It is noteworthy that of the eight characteristics suggested
by the survey (see Table 4), large size came in last in
directors' estimation of importance.

Table 4
What characteristics are important for a company to be a successful acquirer?
High
Importance

Some
Importance

No
Importance

Strong management skills

94%

A well-formulated strategic plan

86

14

0

Excess cash or underutilized debt capacity

52

40

8

Potential synergy with the target company

51

39

10

Intimate knowledge of the target company's
business

48

41

11

Above-average profitability

46

47

7

Above-average price-to-earnings ratio

41

52

7

6

61

33

Large size

6%

0%
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After subsiding somewhat in the mid-1970s, merger
activity returned to high levels in the latter years of the
decade. As Figure 3 shows, however, a substantial decline
occurred in the second quarter of 1980, and many economists
and businessmen have wondered if this downward trend will
continue.
Seventy percent of the respondents think it will (Table 5).
Of these, many foresee an even steeper decline ahead, owing
mainly to stricter government regulation and high interest
rates. In their remarks, some directors also predicted
that the dwindling number of attractive candidates for
acquisition and a rise in the stock market may contribute
to a decrease in mergers.
"Every board that I'm on," said one director, "has a policy
in favor of acquiring other companies. Many boards are very
fussy about the type of company they want to acquire, the
terms of acquisition, and the degree of fit, but they all
would like to acquire somebody. So merger activity is
going to continue, but at a decreasing rate, I think. We're
not building as many new companies as we should in this
country, and those new companies are the great opportunities for acquisition."
Merger activity "will always be a significant factor,"
another director agreed. "It's part of the process of rationalization. But it's cyclical. There are peaks and valleys."
Directors who predict an increase in merger activity say it
will come as a result of lower interest rates and the drive of
companies to grow. Also, continuing high inflation will keep
the cost of building a new operation above that of buying
an existing company and will weaken some companies
financially, leaving them vulnerable to takeover. Foreign
investment, moreover, will continue at a high rate. And
finally, the tax laws make financial restructuring more
rewarding than productive investment.
"I'm positive," one director said, "that merger activity
has declined only because of high interest rates and the
government restraints on nonproductive loans. Basically,
the economics of acquisitions remain superb. So when
those restraints are lifted and interest rates become a little
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Table 5
Do you think merger activity will continue to decline at the present rate, decline
faster, or begin to increase?
Continue to decline

41 %

Decline faster because of
harsher government regulation
Decline faster because of
unfavorable economic conditions, such as high interest rates
Increase

17%

17%

30%

NOTE: Percentages add up to more than 100 because some
participants checked more than one response.

more reasonable—and particularly if the SEC succeeds
in preempting the state merger laws—we're going to see an
absolute turkey shoot."
These dissenting opinions notwithstanding, it is striking
that such a substantial majority of respondents—70 percent—predict a decrease in merger activity in the coming
years. Since most of the respondents are directors of at
least three companies, this prediction may prove to be a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
400

MERGERS COMPLETED
300

200

100
1975

1976

1977

1978

1979
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Figure 3. Quarterly Merger Activity, 1975-1980
The data shown are for mergers completed for value in excess

of $700,000. Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, The Journal of
Corporate Venture, various issues.
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Section 2

THE MERGER DECISION
When a company becomes the object of a merger proposal,
it must decide whether to accept the offer or to oppose it.
The interests of many parties stand to be affected by this
decision—not only the company's stockholders and employees, but its customers, its suppliers, and the community in
which it is located. The effect on one group of stockholders,
moreover, might differ from that on another; and the effect
on top management might differ from that on other
employees.
Some of these parties are in a position to influence the
decision and others are not. The survey asked directors who,
in their experience, actually does have a say It also asked for
their opinion on who should have a say.
Ninety-two percent of the respondents report that the
chief executive officer does in fact have a significant influence on the decision (Table 6). There is little doubt that
he should have at least some say in the matter (only one
respondent said the CEO should have no influence at all).
But when asked how much influence the CEO should have,
a substantial minority (29 percent) say only some. Interesting to note is that 31 percent of the respondents have
participated in five or more mergers during their experience
as directors. Nearly half of this group (46 percent) say the
CEO should be limited to only some influence on the decision
(statistics derived from the demographics and further
tabulation of the raw data).
Even more interesting, perhaps, is the response of another
group—directors who are CEOs themselves (34 percent).
Like the other respondents, 90 percent of this group recognize that the CEO does have a significant influence on the
decision. But 70 percent believe that he should have this
much influence. In other words, 20 percent of the CEOs think
that the CEO has more influence than he ought to have.
One director explained that the inside directors and the
CEO usually set the stage for the decision. Their opinion
carries the most weight, he said, because they are the best
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Table 6
When a target company has decided to accept or oppose a merger proposal, to
what degree have the following influenced the final decision? To what degree
should they influence the decision?
Significant Influence

Some Influence

No Influence

Does
Have

Should
Have

Does
Have

Should
Have

Does
Have

Should
Have

Chief executive officer

92%

71%

8%

29%

0%

0%

Outside directors

54

79

44

20

2

1

Dominant stockholder

54

57

33

39

13

4

Inside directors

42

44

52

45

6

11

Other

22

40

39

30

39

30

informed. "But these insiders have more than just an investor's interest in the issue. Their careers and ego commitments may also be at stake.Toavoid being placed in a position where they must report to someone else in the acquiring company's hierarchy, they may push for a decision to
oppose the merger even though the offer would give stockholders good value for their shares. Or this motivation might
also work the other way, as in the case of a retirement-age
CEO who favors a merger because he would rather be the
last king than provide a successor to manage the independent company."
Since the interests of stockholders as a whole could suffer
in such situations, many respondents think that outside
directors should have more influence on the decision than
they usually do. Whereas 54 percent of the respondents say
that outside directors already influence the decision significantly, 79 percent say they should. Once again, the spread
was even wider among those who have participated in five
or more mergers during their experience as a director. Of
this group, 51 percent report that outside directors do have
significant influence and 91 percent believe they should.
Given that the CEO and the inside directors will inevitably have a powerful influence on the merger decision, what
measures could better insure that they will throw their
weight behind the interests of the stockholders? One director
suggested that if the top officers have a reasonable amount
of stock under option, their interests will more nearly coincide with those of the stockholders. Another said: "If I had
my way, any company that I was associated with would protect the top three or four officers of the company, whether
directors or not, with a personal services contract assuring
them of very generous compensation in case they were
thrown out as a result of an acquisition." Protected by such a
contract, officers of a company whose board decided to oppose
a merger could "fight to the death," knowing that if they
lost both the takeover battle and their jobs, they could still
meet their family responsibilities for two or three years.
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O f course, the parties that influence the merger decision
can, and normally do, consider interests other than their own
private advantage. The survey asked directors what
interests usually are considered in making this decision, and
what interests ought to be considered. Once again, many
respondents think that stockholder interests are given less
consideration than they ought to be given, while topmanagement interests receive more consideration than they
should (Table 7).
As for other parties who are likely to be affected by the
merger decision, particularly employees, customers, and the
community, a consistent minority seemed to side with the
director who said: "I don't think it should be strictly the
interests of the stockholders alone. It has to be a balance of
interests, with weight given to large stockholders and small,
to employees, customers, suppliers, and all the other parties
that have a stake in the company. Different weights should
be given to each interest, but no standard formula exists to
tell you how much weight each one should have. It depends
on the type of company, its financial position, and its stage
in the life cycle." Other respondents dissent from this view.
In their opinion, the stockholders' interests should be
given major consideration. One director argued that the
risk-to-reward ratio on equity investment is already unfavorable and would become even more so if other interests
prevailed over those of the stockholders on basic issues such
as a merger decision. This, he said, would further deter
saving, capital formation, and investment.
"Efficiency and humanity don't always go together,"
another director admitted. "But mergers can be a mechanism for the market to extort efficiency out of capital, and
there's a good case to be made for efficiency. It creates and
protects jobs. If you're not efficient, foreign investors will
take you over."
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Table 7
When final decisions have been made to accept or oppose a merger proposal,
to what degree have the interests of the following been considered? Whose
interests should be given the most weight?
Consideration
Actually Given
Significant Some

Consideration
Should be Given
None

Significant

Some

None

5%

0%

All stockholders as a group

78%

20%

2%

95%

Top management

58

40

2

33

61

6

Long-term stockholders

42

43

15

47

40

13

Directors

30

41

29

22

35

43

Other employees

28

63

9

31

66

3

Customers

20

58

22

24

62

14

Community

14

58

28

22

65

13

Suppliers

8

48

44

7

50

43

Arbitrageurs

4

11

85

0

6

94

Although a notable minority of the respondents maintain
that the interests of parties other than stockholders should
be given significant consideration (see Table 7), directors are
almost unanimous in rejecting the suggestion that these
interests should have separate representation on corporate
boards (Table 8). Apparently the calls often made for board
representation for employees, minorities, and community
interests have failed to persuade many corporate directors.
One respondent argued that separate representation
should be unnecessary. "The outside directors," he said,
"should be well enough aware of their duties as board
members, and experienced enough as business people, to
represent nonstockholder interests effectively. A competent
outside director can stand very solidly for the interests of
minorities, customers, suppliers, the community, and so on."
Another director was more succinct. Separate representation for nonstockholders, he remarked, is "hogwash
dreamed up by inside directors to serve their own interest."

Table 8
Because of their possible effects on mergers, should interests other than
stockholders have separate representation on corporate boards?
No, only stockholders should be represented
Yes, other interests should be represented

89%
11 %

These interests should include:
Community

65%

Employees other than top management
Minority groups
Customers
Suppliers
Other

53%

26%

17%
13%

22%

NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one nonstockholder
interest.
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W h a t is the best reason for fighting a takeover bid? To
refuse an offer that is too low, directors answer. "When the
price, whether in terms of present money, future money, or
stock in the acquiring corporation, does not represent fair
value for the stockholders, then and only then should a vigorous defense be mounted," one director said. This seems to
sum up the preponderance of opinion measured by the survey
(Table 9).
Consistently enough, directors go on to identify the worst
reason for resisting acquisition as that of protecting top
management. Seventy-seven percent of them categorize this
as a weak justification.
Independence for independence's sake receives only
lukewarm support. It is described as an excellent reason for
resisting acquisition by 28 percent of the respondents. Some
directors believe that independence can, under certain circumstances, be justified against a takeover bid that seems
attractive on a short-term basis. When a company's prospects
for future growth are bright, a price that looks handsome
today might be considered inadequate after a few years,
particularly if the acquirer intends to take the company in
a direction that will not lead toward its best opportunities.
On this line of thought, however, the ultimate value is not
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Table 9
In the face of an unwelcome tender offer, how do you rate the following reasons
for mounting a vigorous defense?
Excellent

Good

Weak

To elicit a higher bid price from the acquirer

54%

26%

20%

To preserve the possibility of a subsequent
negotiated transaction with a bidder of
the company's choice

53

39

8

To protect the company's independence

28

29

43

To protect the corporate organization from
possible disruptive changes

27

40

33

To preserve a mutually beneficial
relationship between the company and
the community

21

50

29

6

17

77

To protect top management

independence itself but the interests of the stockholders—
their long-term interests. And this value can just as well
serve as a reason to accept a merger offer. "The real justification for mergers, other than saving financially distressed
companies," said one director, "is to bring in small, struggling
companies which, on their own financial resources, would
take perhaps twenty years to reach their full potential, but
can do it infiveif they come into your larger, wellfinanced company."
Yet directors do not entirely reject reasons that are only
tangential to the interests of the stockholders. Although the
preservation of a mutually beneficial relationship between a
company and the community is rated as an excellent reason
for opposing a takeover bid by only 21 percent, it is accepted
as a good reason by 50 percent. Those rating it as excellent
appear to be roughly the same minority that think community interests should be given significant consideration
in the merger decision (22 percent: see Table 7)—in general,
those directors who favor a balancing of interests, not an
exclusive consideration of stockholder interests alone. "The
only illegitimate reason for opposing a takeover bid," said one
of this persuasion, "is to place the interests of those making
the decisions over the interests of the other people who
should be considered."
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Section 3

WAYS AND MEANS
To a certain extent, the tactics that a besieged company may
use in fighting a takeover bid are governed by state and
federal law, but in many circumstances the law leaves the
use of a particular tactic up to the company's discretion.
For example, when a company decides to resist a takeover
bid from one would-be acquirer, the best defense may be
to merge with another, more desirable acquirer—a white
knight.TOgive the white knight an advantage in the contest,
the besieged company may consider making it privy to
confidential information that is withheld from the unwelcome bidder.
T h e survey asked directors whether they thought it proper
to give confidential information to a white knight while
withholding the same information from another bidder.
Forty-six percent say yes (Table 10). "White knights will
enter the contest only if they get help from the besieged," one
director explained, "and without white knights there's no
auction."
Presumably, stockholders would benefit from an auction
that bids prices up, but some directors doubt that the
encouragement of white knights is always motivated by
concern for stockholder interests. "White knights," one
respondent said, "are generally guys who assure top
management of better jobs. Often they're managementdominated companies with no significant stockholder."
Another respondent stipulated that a white knight should
get privileged access to confidential information only if the
decision is made by the besieged company's stockholders.
Strictly on the issue of propriety, some respondents believe
that management and the board of directors have the right
and indeed the duty to employ this tactic if, in their judgment, the company's future should lie with the white knight;
while a narrow majority (54 percent) believe that no
confidential information should be given to any bidder or
that the same information should be given to all bidders. But
respondents of this persuasion say they are under no illusion
that such fairness actually prevails. "The way it should be,"
one said, "is that both sides should have equal information.
The way it is, of course, is that the white knight gets the
inside data."
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Table 10
Suppose a company is resisting a takeover attempt, and suppose a more
desirable company (a "white knight") enters the bidding contest. Is it proper
for the target company to give confidential information to the white knight
while denying it to the first bidder?
Yes, the target may give the information
to the bidder it finds most attractive

46%

No, the information should be available to all
No, the information should remain confidential

30%
24%

Another tactic used by some companies that feel vulnerTable 11
able to takeover attempts is a kind of preventive meaA potential target company can prevent a law firm from opposing it in a hostile
sure, adopted before any tender offer has been announced.
tender offer by hiring the firm on a retainer basis. In the majority of cases, is the
The company keeps a law firm specializing in tender
payment of these contingency fees in the stockholder's best interests?
offers on retainer, both to prevent a would-be acquirer from
Yes
53%
engaging the same firm and to have expert legal help on
hand in case of a sudden takeover bid. The survey asked
Yes, because the assurance of
directors whether they thought this tactic, which involves
the best available legal talent is likely
the regular payment of retainer fees to a law firm, is usually
to be in the stockholder's best interests
48%
in the best interests of the stockholders. Fifty-three percent
agree that it is (Table 11).
Yes, because a vigorous
One director explained: "Even when management hires
defense will result in higher
the best gunslingers it can get just to protect its own stock
prices for the stockholder's shares
15%
options and jobs, the stockholders usually get a much higher
Yes, for other reasons
0%
price in a tender offer because, with the law firm's help, the
company can fight the takeover long and hard."
No
47%
Directors who disagree point out that whereas at one time
No, because specialized legal
expertise in tender offers was concentrated in only a few law
talents today are available
firms, there are now many large, reputable firms with
from many firms and such
specialists in this area. Also, the current SEC-mandated
investments are therefore unnecessary
35%
twenty-day waiting period has ended the era of the "Saturday night special," when "you didn't even know you were the
No, because such contingency fees
object of a hostile tender offer until you read it in the Monday
are usually paid to protect manWall Street Journal, and you had no time at all in which to

work. If you had to go looking for a law firm at that point, and
found mostfirmsgiving top priority to companies that had
them on retainer, it could be tough."

agement at the expense of stockholders
No, for other reasons

15%

1%

NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one reason for yes or no.
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Some besieged companies have also been astonished to
learn that the attempt to take them over was being financed by their own bank. A clear majority of the respondents—60 percent—think banks should not knowingly make
loans to finance the hostile takeover of one of their own
customers (Table 12). "Immoral," one director called it.
Although banks place a so-called "Chinese Wall" between
lending officers and trust officers, and between two lending
officers serving two such customers, some danger remains
that the wall may be breached. And even if it holds firm, "a
bank must not only do what is right, but appear to be doing
right. The banking system cannot sustain itself on perceived
improprieties. It doesn't matter what the truth of the matter
is. If it looks bad, it is bad for the banking system."
Although only 12 percent of the respondents say there is
nothing at all wrong with such loans, 28 percent say they
may be proper under certain circumstances. Some directors
feel that when a bank has only a line relationship with the
target company, it may loan money to take the company over.
"I think it's too restrictive," said one director, "to insist that a
bank is immediately excluded from financing the takeover of
anyone it has any kind of relationship with." But a director of
the "under no circumstances" camp countered by arguing
that line banks receive the same information about a
customer as the lead bank does, since they make the same
kind of credit analysis. Thus, the distinction between line
and lead banks is irrelevant to this issue.
In addition to the type of relationship that a bank has with
a customer, the bank might properly consider the amount of
credit it provides, another respondent suggested. "If a bank
has $100 million out on one customer, and that company
wants to acquire another customer, of whom the bank, as one
of fourteen in the line, has a $100,000 piece, then I think the
bank has to say to the smaller customer: sorry about that.
The ratio is 100 million to 100 thousand. What if it's only 50
million to 500 thousand? Well, at some point the ratio gets
too narrow and you have a real conflict of interest. But there
is a common-sense area in which you should go along and
make the loan for a hostile tender offer."
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Table 12
Recently some banks have helped to finance the takeover of one of their
customers by another. Should a bank make such loans in the case of a hostile
takeover bid? In the case of a friendly takeover bid?
Hostile
Such loans should take place
Such loans are inappropriate

12%
60%

Such loans are appropriate only in
special cases—when, for example,
the bank is one of several line
banks and has no lead relationship to the target company
28%
Friendly
Such loans should take place

85%

Such loans are inappropriate

5%

Such loans are appropriate only in special cases

10%

A friendly tender offer is a different matter altogether,
directors agree. Eighty-five percent say it is proper for a
bank to loan money to one customer for the purpose of taking
over another customer in a friendly merger. Conflict of
interest does not apply in this case, they observe. "If it's a
friendly deal, the people who are acquiring will have as
much information as the bank."
But is it really a friendly deal? Are the stockholders in
favor of the merger, or only the management? These
questions give rise to reservations in some directors' minds.
"It's not always easy to draw the line between friendly and
hostile," one observed. "This puts the bank in the position of
having to decide how friendly a tender offer is," said another.
T h e survey also elicited directors' opinions on the role
of investment bankers in acquisitions. If an investment
banker's client becomes the object of a hostile takeover
attempt, is it ever proper for the investment banker to aid
the would-be acquirer?
No, never, say 76 percent of the respondents (Table 13).
"It's worse than wrong," one director emphasized. "It's disgraceful." Referring to a recent highly publicized case of
this nature, in which a court found the investment banker
not liable for damages, another director said: "Yes, I read all
the verbiage, all the cosmetics, all the nice terms. But none of
it changes the fact that the investment banker profited
mightily by abusing the trust given it." Still another, while
admitting that the case may have looked worse than it really
was, said, "I don't care about the reality and the appearance.
Investment bankers just have to be cleaner than that. It's
one of the penalties of being in their business."
Directors who believe that an investment banker may,
under some circumstances, aid a would-be acquirer in a
hostile takeover of a client often stipulate that the investment banker should not divulge inside information if the
client released the information with the clear expectation
that it be kept confidential.

Table 13
Suppose an investment banker has confidential information about a client,
and the client becomes the target of a hostile takeover attempt. Under what
circumstances is it proper for the investment banker to aid the would-be
acquirer in the takeover attempt?
An investment banker should never aid a
hostile takeover of one of its clients

76%

A n investment banker can aid the
would-be acquirer a s long as it
does not disclose the confidential
information it has about the target company
The investment banker can aid the
would-be acquirer only because the target
company is trying to obtain a higher price
Other

19%

3%

2%
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W h e n a company finds itself the object of a tender offer, the
board of directors often commissions the company's investment banker to evaluate its stock. This evaluation provides
some bench mark with which to compare the price being
offered by the would-be acquirer. Are such evaluations
reasonably accurate?
Some 4 percent of the respondents answer yes, "virtually
always" (Table 14). Forty-seven percent say that these
evaluations are "usually" accurate, and 36 percent rate them
as "sometimes" accurate. Thirteen percent answer "seldom."
"I would guess it's somewhere around the middle," said
one director, "mainly because of the difficulty of valuing a
business. The investment banker, because of his entree into
the company, might have a better chance of coming close
than a financial analyst would."
Another director explained: "Appraisals of this sort are
inherently very difficult. You shouldn't expect to get a correct answer. But in the final analysis, you have to have an
appraisal. Even a bad one is better than none. So you get the
best you can, be skeptical as hell about it, and follow your
instincts."
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Table 14
In defending against a hostile tender offer, corporate boards often ask their
investment bankers to advise them of the adequacy of the price bid by the
would-be acquirer. In your experience, do the opinions that result from this
procedure correctly gauge the appropriate value of the company and the
premium that can be expected by stockholders to maximize their opportunity?
Virtually always
Usually
Sometimes
Seldom

4%

47%
36%
13%

Section 4

COSTS AND BENEFITS
"Acquisitions," one director wrote, "produce growth. Growth Table 15
is a factor in basic reputation. Reputation develops morale,
What are the major benefits that a company can realistically expect to gain by
energy, acceptance. Acquisition is almost spiritual in its
acquisition?
effects on the acquirer."
Little
There are also several benefits of a more physical nature
that one company may realistically expect to gain by
acquiring another, directors say. Fifteen specific benefits
suggested by the survey are rated by the respondents in the
order shown in Table 15. Perhaps the most interesting thing
about these data is that "little or no benefit" received so few
votes. Table 15 can be read as a massive confirmation of most
of the benefits ever hoped for in making a tender offer.
Against this background of general confirmation, the
possible advantages that fell to the bottom of the list deserve
particular attention. The utilization of excess cash, whether
it belongs to the acquiring company or the acquired, is rated
as a major benefit by less than 30 percent of the respondents.
Also, taking over another company just to get bigger is
seen as providing little or no benefit by 63 percent of the
respondents. In their remarks, some directors expressed
skepticism that stockholders benefit from acquisitions made
primarily to inflate management egos. Yet they do recognize
special situations in which bigger may be better. One gave
this example: "Occasionally mergers take place involving,
let's say, six regional producers. As a national organization,
they enjoy the advantages of a national marketing program,
national TV scheduling, and certain economies of scale—
things they could never have done as regional companies."
While confirming so many of the benefits suggested by
the survey, directors often caution that the achievement
of any real benefits in a merger depends on the particular
circumstances. "There are many variables affecting the
realization of expected benefits," said one director, "but two
things are especially important. First, how well does the
acquiring company know the industry of the acquired? If
not very well, it could be disappointed. And second, what
attitude does the acquiring company take toward integrating the incoming people, resources, and facilities with its
own? Only too rarely is the process of integration given any
thought before the merger takes place."

Major
Benefit

Secondary
Benefit

Diversifying into a new area, but one related
to the acquiring company's expertise

68%

29%

3%

Increasing profits by a synergistic combination
of marketing and distribution facilities

67

29

4

Acquiring a new product to round out the
acquiring company's product line

64

35

1

Increasing profits by a synergistic combination
of production facilities

60

32

8

Increasing the earnings per share of the
acquiring company

51

39

10

Increasing profits by a synergistic combination
of management expertise

49

40

11

Increasing market share

46

36

18

Increasing profits by installing new management techniques in the target company

42

41

17

Diversifying into a completely new area

42

32
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Acquiring a company whose management has
not provided the leadership to maximize
return on investment

41

48

11

Obtaining a reliable source of raw material

39

46

15

Enjoying the financial benefits of acquiring an
underpriced company

38

44

18

Using the excess c a s h and underutilized
borrowing capacity of the acquiring
company

29

53

18

Using the excess cash of the target company

22

59

19

6

31

63

Increasing the size of the acquiring
organization

or No
Benefit
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After a merger, what problems are most likely to prevent Table 16
After a merger has taken place, which of the following are likely to create
the expected benefits from being achieved? Directors give
problems, and to what extent?
first place to the difficulty of integrating two different
organizations, followed closely by the voluntary departure
Major
Secondary
No
of key managers of the acquired company (Table 16). "As a
Problem
Problem
Problem
CEO," one director explained, "you've been used to running
your own show, and now all of a sudden you're just a division Difficulty of effectively integrating two
different organizations
61%
38%
1%
president. Now, instead of reporting to a board of directors,
you're reporting to a CEO who is probably your own age plus
Voluntary departure of key managers of the
or minus five years. That presents a problem." In addition,
acquired company
55
41
4
it is very difficult, as another director said, "to change the
customs of a company. You have to change their accounting
Unrealistic initial plans—for example, sales
and control procedures, their policy manuals, their pension
grow more slowly than anticipated
35
56
9
plan, their vacation policy. You have to accommodate two
Unpleasant surprises—for example, the
different managerial styles. A few corporations have been
discovery of a major legal liability
29
50
21
able to cope with this, but more often the dominant company
makes a fetish of forcing the incoming group into its own
pattern."
Most directors also recognize that major or secondary
problems can arise either from unrealistic initial plans for
the merger or from unpleasant surprises, such as the discovery of a legal liability. "A hostile takeover can be very
foolish," one director pointed out, "when you don't know the
quality of the inventories or receivables you've acquired, or
the nature of the credit lines. So nowadays, companies are
looking for good management in the companies they're
considering for acquisition, on the theory that good management is their best guarantee against nasty surprises."
Again, many respondents want it understood that the obstacles, if any, to the achievement of benefits from a merger
depend on the particular circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a large majority
of respondents see at least a secondary problem lurking in all
of the possible trouble areas suggested by the survey. "I agree
with Murphy's Law," one director said: "Anything that can
go wrong will go wrong—and at the worst possible time.
It is hard to integrate two organizations. People do get disenchanted. Companies don't have the right expectations.
And there's maybe a 60 or 70 percent chance that some very
unpleasant surprises will turn up. People don't tell you
everything."
28

Table 17
I n rating the possible benefits of mergers and judging
To what extent do the following benefit by successful hostile tender offers, and to
the problems that may prevent these benefits from being
what extent are they adversely affected?
achieved (Tables 15 and 16), respondents were allowed to
assume that they were speaking of friendly mergers. In the
Harm
next question, they were asked to concentrate on hostile
Benefit
takeovers only.
SignifiSignifiSince a director's primary responsibility is to the stockcant
Some
No
cant
Some
No
Benefit
Benefit
Benefit
Harm
Harm
Harm
holders, the respondents' rating of the effects of a hostile
but successful takeover bid on stockholder interests is
Stockholders of acquiring
particularly important. The impression given by the data
2%
43%
55%
71%
16%
company
13%
shown in Table 17 is that directors are somewhat guarded
about the benefit that such mergers provide for stockholders. Stockholders of target
57
8
35
12
35
53
company
Moreover, many directors feel that this benefit, if any, may
be mixed with harm.
Top management of acquiring
Directors are more positive about the benefit that hostile
21
47
3
76
10
company
43
mergers provide for top management of the acquiring
company, but for the top management of the acquired comTop management of a well42
25
50
25
43
15
managed target company
pany a clear majority see at least some harm. As Table 17
shows, the top managers of a poorly managed company that
management of a poorly
is taken over are likely to suffer more harm, in respondents' Topmanaged
80
12
8
4
17
79
target company
opinion, than the top managers of a well-managed company;
but even the latter are believed to have little to gain and
Other employees of acquiring
—
1
—
—
26
73
company
much to lose.
Other parties affected by a hostile takeover are also
Other employees of target
believed to fare badly. Both the community in which the
8
59
33
3
36
company
61
acquired company is located and the company's employees
other than top management suffer some harm and gain no
Outside directors of acquiring
—
—
—
6
45
49
company
benefit, say a majority of respondents. Only the customers
and suppliers of the acquired company are believed to escape
Outside directors of target
real harm as a result of the merger.
37
14
43
20
86
company
0
In their comments, several directors explained the circumstances in which hostile takeovers could produce gains Community in which target
13
52
32
35
3
65
company is located
or losses for stockholders. For their shares in the acquired
company, stockholders usually receive a premium over the
2
31
67
—
—
Customers of target company —
stock's market price. Thus, even after paying the capital
gains tax, they may net a profit which they can reinvest as
44
—
—
—
2
54
Suppliers of target company
they see fit. But this premium price may still be lower than
NOTE: Dashes indicate that for this party the question was not asked.
the company's liquidation value. Because stockholders are
seldom given the choice of liquidation, they may accept the
tender offer "knowing that the inherent value of their shares
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is much higher. So they simply take their cash," one director
charged, "and leave the market. And then we wonder why!"
Another director observed that in the long run, "You never
know how much an investment would have grown if left in
the company, as compared with the growth achieved by
accepting the tender offer, paying the capital gains tax, and
investing the money elsewhere."
The long-run benefits to the stockholders of the acquiring
company, meanwhile, depend on "how well the marriage
works out. If the acquiring company has a good strategic
plan, if the acquired company fits into it, and if management
recognizes the people factor in the merger, then the stockholders and everyone else concerned can benefit. But if the
integration process doesn't work and the incoming people
are mismanaged, then the stockholders are hurt and so is
everyone else. Unfortunately, a lot of acquired companies
have been very badly managed by the acquiring company."
H o w do the parties involved fare when a hostile takeover
bid fails? Obviously, the effects are less serious than when
the attempt succeeds, directors say. For top management
of the target company, "it's like getting mugged and losing
only fifty dollars and your credit cards. The cash loss doesn't
break you, and reporting the loss of your cards doesn't take a
lot of time. But it's still a disagreeable experience."
On this analogy, however, the mugger enjoys some small
gain, whereas in a hostile takeover bid that ultimately fails,
directors believe that everyone loses. As Table 18 shows, a
majority of the respondents say that even the stockholders of
the bidding company suffer at least some harm. And the top
management of the would-be acquirer is most likely to be hurt
—74 percent of the respondents say this party suffers at least
some harm.
Directors observed that a company's image is tarnished
when it fails in a takeover attempt. In addition, both companies spend a great deal of money in the battle—money that
might otherwise have benefited the stockholders through
dividends or capital improvements. The battle also consumes
a great deal of top management's time, possibly causing
both companies to suffer from lack of careful, attentive
management.
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Table 18
To what extent are the following harmed by unsuccessful hostile tender offers?
Significant
Harm

Stockholders of bidding company

4%

Some
Harm

No
Harm

49%

47%

Stockholders of target company

13

46

41

Top management of bidding company

12

62

26

Top management of target company

11

47

42

Other employees of bidding company

0

18

82

Other employees of target company

3

30

67

Outside directors of bidding company

6

39

55

Outside directors of target company

5

29

66

Next, directors were asked for their views on a much
broader topic: What long-range effects do mergers in general have on society? Six effects often suggested by economists were rated by the respondents as shown in Table 19.
One point brought out by these data is that directors
clearly tend to believe that mergers result in a net benefit to
customers. While nine out of ten directors agree that
products are produced more efficiently through mergers and
priced to give customers greater value, only half say that
customers suffer because of greater monopoly power brought
about through mergers.
It is also clear, though not by such a wide margin, that
directors tend to approve of the effect of mergers on the
merging companies themselves. Only 13 percent deny that
mergers have any disciplinary effect on top management
at all, and 39 percent say that this effect is significant.
But the alleged depersonalization caused by mergers is
called significant by only 20 percent, and 38 percent call
it unimportant.
Directors who volunteered comments went beyond the six
effects suggested by the survey, pointing out that the effects
depend on whether it is a good merger or a bad merger. Good
mergers often save companies that are in danger of failing,
they say. Such mergers "really save jobs, and save business
for suppliers, distributors, and dealers."
Bad mergers "over-reward some people for acquiring the
works of others, cutting the others off from the long-term
benefits of their own works. This is damaging to the country
and indeed to the free enterprise system throughout the
world, for this system thrives only when the greatest
rewards go to the entrepreneur and the independent
developer."
Another director speculated that merger activity, if
unchecked by market forces or government restrictions,
might eventually result in the ownership of the bulk of
American business by a few super-giant corporations. Inevitably, these corporations would be subject to increasingly
powerful government control, and finally business would
discover that it had merged itself into socialism.

Table 19
The following are cited as possible long-range effects of mergers on society.
To what degree are they important?
Significant
Importance

Secondary
Importance

No
Importance

Capital is redeployed to a more efficient use

63%

27%

10%

Products are produced more efficiently and
priced to give customers greater value

56

33

11

T h e existence of an active acquisitions
mechanism serves a s an effective
discipline for the top management of
publicly traded companies

39

48

13

Social interactions become increasingly
depersonalized because mergers foster
ever-larger corporations

20

42

38

Customers suffer because, despite
government regulation, mergers result in
greater monopoly power

13

38

49

Investors suffer because mergers increase
the complexity of companies, thus
making them more difficult to analyze and
evaluate

6

45

49
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Section 5

REGULATING MERGERS
Government definitely has a role in regulating mergers, say
the directors who participated in the survey. Seventy-six
percent support government regulation in one form or
another, and of these, 95 percent see a need for antitrust
regulation to protect competition. The administration of
antitrust laws, however, came in for criticism. "One often
wonders," said one respondent, "if the purposes of the
legislation are really being served by all the paperwork
that's required."
Other forms of regulation received less support (Table 20).
Forty-five percent of the directors supporting any regulation
specifically endorse federal takeover laws, and 34 percent
endorse state takeover laws. It should be noted, however,
that 34 percent of the directors taking part in the survey are
also CEOs (see Table 28), and of this group only 12 percent
support state or federal takeover laws. Also, the respondents
have had more experience as acquirers than as objects of
tender offers (see Tables 26 and 27). A group of directors who
have been more often on the receiving end might express
more support for takeover laws.
Prohibition of some takeover tactics that are now permitted
received the support of 18 percent of the directors favoring
regulation. "The purpose of the antitrust law is the protection of a free market," one of this minority stated. "Certain
takeover tactics have the opposite effect."
Legislation limiting or prohibiting foreign takeovers is
supported by 15 percent of the directors favoring regulation.
"The takeover of U.S. banks by foreign banks, many of which
are partially government owned, should be prohibited," said
one director. "I don't think a foreign company should buy a
U.S. company that does important defense work," said
another.
Prohibition of large mergers received the support of only
12 percent of the directors favoring regulation.Onerespondent, however, suggested the possibility that certain types of
large acquisitions might be made subject to a longer waiting
period and jurisdictional review.
Prohibition of hostile takeovers, with only 8 percent,
received the least support from directors favoring regulation.
One director expressing the majority opinion said: "Specific
prohibitions, whether of hostile takeovers, large mergers,
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Table 20
What is the appropriate role of government in merger regulation?
T h e market,
not the government, should rule

24%

T h e market should rule, except for governmental regulation in the following areas:
Antitrust regulation

95%

Federal takeover statutes
State takeover statutes

76%

45%
34%

Prohibitions against some takeover
tactics that are currently permissible

18%

Prohibitions against foreign takeovers

15%

Prohibitions against large mergers

12%

Prohibitions against hostile takeovers
Other

8%

4%

All mergers should be prohibited

0%

NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one form of regulation.

foreign takeovers, or whatever, are political issues. Purely
from the standpoint of benefiting investors, the government
only has to insure full disclosure. And full disclosure, of
course, involves the antitrust law."
Should regulation have the general effect of making
mergers any easier or more difficult than they are now? No,
answer 54 percent of the respondents (Table 21). Thirty-five
percent say yes, the general effect of regulation should be
changed to make mergers easier; while 11 percent say a
change is needed to make mergers more difficult.
"I don't think there's any simple answer to that question,"
one director said. "Some profound thinking and writing have
been done on the subject. I'm inclined to let merger activity
continue at about the same rate, with government giving a
constant but fair review of the antitrust results. Government
should also remain flexible, because it's a delicate area."

Table 21

I n the belief that large corporations have too much political
power, Senator Edward Kennedy and others have advocated
legislation aimed at preventing further concentration of
power by restraining mergers between large companies.
Respondents to the survey neither agree with the premise
nor support the proposed remedy (Table 22). Eighty-two percent deny that large corporations have too much political
power, and 80 percent oppose legislation restraining mergers
between large companies. However, some respondents, by
subscribing to one proposition but not both, demonstrate
that the two are not necessarily linked. It is possible to
believe that large corporations have too much political power
without supporting legislation against large mergers, and
possible to support such legislation for reasons other than
preventing the concentration of political power. "A plain,
objective size test could become valid at some point," said
one director. "DuPont can't merge with Allied Chemical
under antitrust, but I wouldn't like to see it merge with
Westinghouse either." Another said: "Yes, some corporations
probably have a great deal of political power. But today, it's
very difficult for them to exercise that power irresponsibly. I
don't think the power of corporations is a persuasive reason
for preventing large mergers."
"All power has grown in the twentieth century," one

Table 22

How should government affect regulation of mergers?
Permit them to stay the same
Make them less difficult
Make them more difficult

54%

35%
11%

Many legislators and social observers argue that large companies have too much
political power. As a result, they want the government to prohibit or severely limit
mergers that significantly increase the economic size of large companies.
Yes

No

Are you concerned that some corporations
have too much political power?

18%

82%

Do you agree that larger mergers should be
severely constrained because of size?

20

80

33

director mused. "Do I want the government to have more
power? I'm not sure. Do I want corporations to have more
power? I'm not sure of that either. Has government shown
that it can run businesses better than private people? I don't
think so. Do very large companies ever abuse their power?
Yes. It's an awfully tough question."
I n January 1980 the SEC adopted the requirement that
tender offers remain open for a minimum of twenty business
days. The commission also proposed that the waiting period
be extended to thirty business days. Eighty-seven percent of
the survey respondents favor the extension (Table 23), and
many say that thirty days is still not time enough. "Thirty
days for resolving the issues of corporate marriage is
absurd," one director said. "Would you approve of your
daughter marrying a man after dating him for only thirty
days?"
Another director, just completing a study of this subject
when he was reached by phone, provided some striking
information. Until January 1980, the minimum waiting
period was seven to ten days, but a variety of delaying tactics
kept most hostile tender offers open much longer. The study,
which covered all of the hostile, competitive tender offers
from November 1974 through December 1979, found that if
bidding had closed at the end of the minimum waiting period,
stockholders would have been deprived of 83 percent of
the bids and 85 percent of the premiums that did, in fact,
subsequently develop. Even if the bidding had closed after
forty-five days, 34 percent of the bids and 51 percent of the
premiums would have been headed off.
If thirty days is still too short a period, how long should
an offer stay open? "I'd say somewhere between thirty and
ninety days," answered one director. "Long enough for a
company to think about the offer and decide whether to
accept it or seek other bids, but not too long for the would-be
acquirer to keep its money and people tied up."
Siding with the respondents who oppose any extension of
the waiting period, another director said: "Twenty business
days is plenty of time. The disruption of normal business
is so severe that the company could go to hell in a handbasket if it had to wait much longer."
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Table 23
The SEC has proposed that tender offers remain open a minimum of thirty
business days. By lengthening the current twenty-day waiting period, this rule
would give target companies more time to look for white knights or to prepare
other defenses.

Do you favor this proposal?

Yes

No

87%

13%

Section 6

THE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
Most of the 217 directors who participated in the survey have
had extensive experience as corporate directors, and this
experience has included involvement in several mergers,
most of them friendly acquisitions.
Sixty-five percent of the survey respondents have been
directors for more than ten years, and 23 percent have been
directors for over twenty years (Table 24).

M ore than half of the respondents currently serve on three
or more boards. Eighteen percent are directors of just one
company, while 31 percent are directors of five or more
(Table 25).

Table 24
How long have you been a corporate director?
1-5 years

12%

6-10 years

23%

11 - 2 0 years

42%

Over 20 years

23%

Table 25
On how many corporate boards do you now serve?
O n e board

18%

Two boards

22%

Three boards

15%

Four boards

14%

Over four boards

Eighty-six percent of the respondents have been on the
board of a company that made at least one acquisition in
the last five years, and of this group four out of five have
experienced at least two acquisitions (Table 26). Thirty-six
percent have been involved as directors in at least five
acquisitions, and some say they have seen as many as forty
or fifty. Most of these acquisitions by far were described as
friendly. Only 6 percent of the group that have been involved
as directors with acquisitions said that any of the acquisitions were hostile.

31 %

Table 26
Has a company on whose board you serve acquired another company within the
last five years?
Yes

86%

No

14%

If yes, how many companies were taken over?
Two or more

80%

Five or more

36%

Have any of these takeovers been hostile?
Yes

6%

No

94%
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than half of the respondents, 44 percent, have served
on the board of a takeover target (Table 27).

Less

Fifty-seven percent of the respondents serve on the board of
the company for which they work (Table 28). Seventy-three
(59 percent) of the inside directors are CEOs. Thus, CEOs
account for 34 percent of all respondents.

Table 27
Have you served on the board of a company while it was the target of a takeover
attempt?
Yes

44%

No

56%

Table 28
Do you serve on the board of the company for which you work?
Yes

57%

No
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If yes, are you the CEO?

I n functional experience, most of the respondents describe
themselves as general managers, with many also indicating
a second field of expertise, frequently finance (Table 29).

Yes

59%

No

41

Table 29
What is your functional or occupational experience?
Number of
Responses
General management

118

Number of
Responses
Law within a corporation

18

Finance

77

Outside law firm

17

Marketing

33

Investment banking

17

Engineering or research

26

Accounting and auditing

12

Manufacturing

21

Other

21

Commercial banking

19

NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one area of experience.
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